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Individual leaders have been central to the transformation of organizations, political institutions
and many instances of social and economic reform. In this paper we take a ﬁrst step towards
analyzing the role of leadership to ask: when and how does a leader engineer change? We show that
while underlying structural conditions and institutions are important, there is an independent ﬁrst-
order role for individual agency in bringing about change and thus transforming the institutions.
We emphasize the key nature of the symbiotic relationship between followers decisions’ to willingly
entrust their faith in the leader and the leader’s initiative at leading them. This two-way interaction
can endogenously give rise to threshold eﬀects; slight diﬀerences in the leader’s ability or the
underlying structural conditions can dramatically improve the prospects for successful change.
Given the centrality of this leader-follower relationship, we further explore conditions under which
an individual may deliberately prefer to follow an ambitious leader with divergent interests rather
than a benevolent one with congruent preferences. Thus by virtue of having followers, both ‘good’
and ‘bad’ leaders may be eﬀective at bringing about change.“Successful economic policy in developing countries is very far from being the product of pure forces
of history — something that happens when it happens because its time has come. Far from it, in
every case about which I have close knowledge, the policy would in all likelihood have failed (or
never got started) but for the eﬀorts of a key group of individuals, and within that group, one or
two outstanding leaders.
Arnold Harberger (1993), Secrets of Success: A Handful of Heroes
“Men make history and not the other way around. In periods where there is no leadership, society
stands still. Progress occurs when courageous skillful leaders seize the opportunity to change things
for the better.”
Harry Truman
“The ocean of individual actions which is history is too vast, too complicated, and too unpredictable
for the actions of one or a few individuals to determine its course...Leaders might be able to identify
the current in the ocean, thus appearing to be controlling the current, but in reality the current’s
direction is unaﬀected.”
Tolstoy’s argument in War and Peace (paraphrased by Ahearns)
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
On 6 April, 1930, Mahatma Gandhi culminated his “Salt March” in the town of Dandi on the
western coast of India. There, in deﬁance of the British monopoly on the collection of salt, he
simply picked up a lump of natural sea salt. Within days, in coordinated civil disobedience across
the country, not only his followers in the Congress Party, but millions throughout India did the
same and demonstrations spread. It is widely agreed that this unique, collective act of non-violent
protest was the ﬁrst shot that eventually brought down the British Empire in India. Gandhi’s
leadership skill showed both in his recognition of the eﬀectiveness of civil disobedience as well as in
his choice of salt as a simple yet emotive symbol that communicated eﬀectively to all individuals
irrespective of their background or religion. However, Gandhi’s case is not unique in its impact.
Throughout history individuals have had a key role to play in some of the most dramatic changes
witnessed. Without Bismarck, the modern German state may never have come into being, just as
in the absence of Abraham Lincoln, the contours of democracy in the U.S. may well have been very
diﬀerent. Moreover, just as Lenin helped orchestrate the October Revolution in Russia, no account
of organizational transformation at General Electric can fail to give Jack Welch a central role. Yet,
economists have not paid much attention to the role of leadership in engendering institutional or
organizational change.1
I nt h i sp a p e rw et a k eaﬁr s ts t e pi nt h i sd i r e c t i o na n da s k :w h e na n dh o wd o e sal e a d e rc a t a l y z e
change, be it in the economic, social or political arena? We emphasize the key nature of the leader’s
symbiotic relationship with potential followers in having a dramatic, transformational impact on
the prospects for change. However, such transformational leadership can be for the better or
worse — for every leader such as Nelson Mandela there is a Robert Mugabe. Accordingly, we
further examine the issue of leader selection (Besley, 2006) to ask whether and when the populace
may in fact prefer to follow a leader they know to be ambitious and unscrupulous, rather than one
who is benevolent and less partisan.
By virtue of their formal authority, leaders in government or business are assured that in certain
domains, individuals have no choice but to follow the policies announced. However, the exercise of
such formal authority through contracts, decrees and diktat is typically much less relevant when
a leader urges a large scale change of the status-quo, be it of institutions, the social order or the
overall economy. While a leader may initiate the process of challenging the status-quo, the success
or failure of such attempted changes depends on how widespread is the popular response to the
leader’s initiative. Such participation in mass movements for social or political change is typically
voluntary — be it the popular overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the participation in Martin Luther
King’s “March on Washington” or the response to Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” to resuscitate
1Hermalin (1998) is a prominent exception. In a signaling framework, the paper focuses on how a manager-leader
can persuade subordinates in a team to take a desirable action.
1economic reform. Accordingly in studying leadership, we emphasize the dynamic between a leader
and potential followers in situations where successful change requires the persuasion of a large
number of individuals to voluntarily undertake a coordinated (costly) set of actions. However
for a complete account, any framework of change should also throw light on the full diversity
of experiences of followers with their leaders. Accordingly, part of the challenge is to explain in
an integrated framework, not only why individuals voluntarily follow leaders such as Gandhi and
Mandela, but also leaders such as Hitler and Mugabe.
This paper attempts to address these issues in a very simple framework. We should emphasize
at the outset that our framework is minimal in that we dispense with some aspects of leadership
and institutional change that are not central to the points that we wish to address here. A key
starting point of our framework is that only through the coordination of actions across a large
number of individuals, can the status-quo be changed. What makes coordination diﬃcult is a lack
of information as to whether the underlying conditions are appropriate for change to occur. It is
in resolving this coordination problem that the leader plays a crucial role.2 The leader plays an
essential role in not only ‘discovering’ and seizing the right ‘window of opportunity’ for change,
but also in communicating it to the population. However on discovery of the right opportunity,
the crucial element for successful change here is how widespread is the response to the leader’s
call for action. Accordingly, the second key element of our framework is that it accords a central
role to the mechanics of followership. People here choose to endogenously become followers by
committing to follow more closely the leader under all circumstances. Of course, doing so is costly
and thus individuals will only become followers if they expect gains from following the leader. As
we show in the paper, this creates a demand for leadership and also in turn aﬀects the supply of
leadership by the leader. In equilibrium, these two forces together determine the probability of
successful change.
We show that leaders who are successful in attracting a core group of committed followers can
be particularly eﬀective in transforming the prospects for change.3 In part this is because such a
committed group of followers,
“....can be ordered to the polls or out onto the streets at will... to swell audiences,
and campaign for him with extraordinary vigor and often at sacriﬁce to themselves.
2Evolutionary biologists such as Tooby and Cosmides (1992) and Krause and Ruxton (2002) have emphasized
that leadership is likely to have evolved in humans to solve coordination problems. According to Van Vugt et
al (2006) “leadership originally emerged to solve simple coordination problems in group-living species and has an
ancient phylogenetic history. Among humans, leadership was co-opted to deal with speciﬁc problems associated with
living in large groups. .....Group decision-making would be facilitated by the emergence of some form of leadership,
whereby some individuals persuaded others to follow them in the direction of a preferred waterhole or hunting
ground”.
3For instance, though the Bolsheviks were a minority, it was the commitment of his Bolshevik supporters that
helped catapult Lenin to power.
2A leader can use such followers as a means of subtle or overt intimidation...He has in
short, a most malleable instrument to use at will.”(Willmer, 1984, pp.184)
We demonstrate that the dynamic interaction between a leader and his followers may give rise
to endogenous thresholds for eﬀective leadership; only if a combination of the leader’s ability and
the underlying structural conditions satisfy a certain threshold, are there positive prospects for
change. Slight changes in this combination can lead to dramatic diﬀerences in the prospects for
change and thus the eﬀectiveness of leaders of very similar ability can be widely diﬀerent. This
is because we show that having committed followers also encourages participation in the process
of change by non-followers. If the leader’s ability is higher than the (endogenous) threshold, he
attracts a core group of committed followers who empower their leader and enable him to even get
non-followers to participate in mounting a challenge to the status-quo. Analyzing the threshold
required for eﬀective leadership, we ﬁnd that when the general outlook for the prospects of change
are pessimistic, only leaders of high enough ability cross this threshold. Thus eﬀective leadership
is harder to achieve under such circumstances.
Much recent research has emphasized the importance of institutions for growth and develop-
ment.4 Our framework suggests that even ‘small’ diﬀerences in leader ability can result in very
diverse outcomes in terms of welfare-improving changes being adopted or not. Thus slight diﬀer-
ences in the quality of leaders of two otherwise similar countries can lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in terms of institutional change and policies adopted. In other words, there is an independent and
ﬁrst-order role for leadership in policymaking. Our analysis suggests that countries need not be
trapped by their institutional inheritance. Rather leaders can serve to transform some institutions
— thus institutions need not be destiny.
We further show that the two-way interaction between the leader and followers gives rise to
multiple equilibria. Expectations matter in that if individuals are optimistic about leadership,
it encourages them to invest in followership and this in turn provides a ﬁllip to the leader to
exert initiative in bringing about change. Thus one feeds back on to the other. Separately, public
perceptions about a leader’s ability as well as fundamentals matter for the exercise of eﬀective
leadership. While the popular perception of leader ability determines the actual threshold for
eﬀective leadership, once this threshold is crossed, the leader’s actual ability helps determine the
overall probability of change. Together with the threshold eﬀect, the fact that Zeitgeist aﬀects
outcomes underlies the diﬃculty in empirically disentangling the underpinnings of leader ability
and leadership. It also suggests that our framework provides a natural way to reconcile the classical
debate between the ‘structuralist’ and the ‘Great Man’ schools of historical change. Structural
conditions aﬀect, but do not fully determine a leader’s eﬀectiveness at bringing about change;
4See for example Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2005) in addition to work by Dixit (2004), Hall and
Jones(1999), Rodrik, Subramaniam and Trebbi (2005) among others.
3there remains a role for individual agency and leadership.5
It is generally believed (e.g. Rotberg 2002) that in a divided society, the most eﬀective leaders
are those who are perceived to be “benevolent”, in that they care about all groups, are balanced
and non-partisan. Such leaders may be much more eﬀective at carrying out reform because they
are able to get support from a wide set of groups who would otherwise be wary of being misled
into supporting reforms that may adversely aﬀect them. However, we show that this intuition is
incomplete in that a benevolent leader may be too conservative in his leadership initiative while
a partisan and “ambitious” leader who is ruthless may be much more eﬀe c t i v ea tb r i n g i n ga b o u t
change. Even more striking is the fact that such an “ambitious” leader may well be preferred to
a “benevolent” one, even by groups that perceive themselves to be vulnerable to manipulation.
So why would any individual ever prefer such a leader? We identify two eﬀects that may work in
opposite directions. On the one hand an “ambitious” leader is more likely to show initiative in
ﬁnding the appropriate conditions and will thus go the extra mile to ‘discover’ a solution — this
is the “ambition” eﬀect. On the other hand the possible downside is that such a leader may lack
credibility and may not be entirely trusted when encouraging individuals to invest in change. This
“credibility eﬀect” may work to undermine the eﬀectiveness of the ambitious leader since followers
may be wary of being manipulated into investing into institutional change that is not in their best
interest. Together these eﬀects give rise to a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship between the
degree of a leader’s ambition and his eﬀectiveness.
In terms of ex-ante welfare, we show that an ambitious leader with preferences diﬀering from
that of followers, may often be preferred to a leader who’s preferences are congruent with those
of the followers. In fact, a desire to align one’s interests with that of the leader may under some
circumstances lead to a bigger following for such leaders, overall leading to higher chances of ‘good’
as well as ‘bad’ changes.
The fact that a ruthless “ambitious” leader can be a force of change for the better is perhaps
best illustrated by Lyndon Johnson’s time as Majority leader in the U.S. Senate. In his masterly
narrative Caro (2002, pp. 862) argued that
“During Lyndon Johnson’s previous political life, compassion had constantly been in
conﬂict with ambition, and invariably ambition had won. ....For the compassion to be
released, to express itself in concrete accomplishments, it would have to be compatible
with the ambition, pointing in the same direction. And now, at last, in 1957, it was....
For at last this leader of men would be leading, ﬁghting, not only for himself but for
a great cause. This man who in the pursuit of his aims could be so utterly ruthless —
5The earliest proponent of the ‘structural’ view were perhaps Marx and Tolstoy. In recent years this view has
received its most systematic exposition by Robert Gilpin in the context of international relations. The original
exponent of the ‘Great Man’ school was Carlyle (1841). Subsequent work by Kissinger (1968) and Ionescu (1991)
h a sa l s ot a k e nt h i sv i e w .
4who would let nothing stand in his way; who, in the pursuit, deceived, and betrayed
and cheated — would be deceiving and betraying and cheating on behalf of something
other than himself: speciﬁcally, on behalf of the sixteen million Americans whose skins
were dark.”
Once Johnson realized that it would help pave the way to the Presidency, institutional change was
inevitable and his ambition and energy helped push through the Voting Rights Act of 1957.
Related Literature: Leadership plays an important role in all forms of human (and primate)
societies (Brown (1991) and E.O. Wilson (1975)). Indeed according to MacGregor Burns (1978),
‘leadership is the most studied and least understood phenomenon in all of the social sciences’.
Nevertheless, with a few prominent exceptions, leadership (as against leaders), has been relatively
understudied by economists. In the literature on organizations, an important early contribution
is that of Hermalin (1998) who in a signaling framework, emphasizes the importance of a leader’s
example in getting a given team of individuals to follow. While his model captures well the
leader’s initiative in the overall process, it does not consider the decision of followers to invest in
followership and thereby empower the leader. In our model, this two-way interaction is crucial to
determine the eﬀectiveness of a given leader. Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) capture leadership
by analyzing in an incomplete contract framework how the degree of empathy the leader has for
the subordinate can alter the latter’s incentives. While in spirit this is similar to the “credibility
eﬀect” in our paper, they do not consider the opposite “motivation eﬀect” and overall the feedback
onto other agents and the leader. Besley and Ghatak (2005) do not directly address the issue of
leadership, but their analysis of ‘motivated’ agents shares some aspects of the leader-follower
relationship studied here. In our model, potential followers can invest in more closely following
the leader under all circumstances, thus aligning their ‘motivation’ with that of the leader. We
study the eﬀect of such ‘motivation’ on other followers, the leader and most importantly on the
overall chances of change. Aghion and Tirole (1997) study the distinction between formal and
real authority in a context where a principal with formal authority may choose to delegate real
authority to a subordinate to reduce incentive problems. In our model, while the leader has the
formal authority to initiate change, whether or not he takes the initiative to do so depends on the
expected response of the population. We show that the leader’s formal authority need not always
translate into eﬀective leadership implying very little real authority under such circumstances.
The literature on institutional change has recognized the importance of leaders in determining
the trajectory of a country. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003) acknowledge
the importance of Seretse Khama in laying the foundations of growth in Botswana. In a more
systematic cross-country analysis, Jones and Olken (2005, 2007) have been the ﬁrst to empirically
demonstrate that leaders matter. They exploit the random death of political leaders and the
5success and failure of assassination attempts on leaders to identify their signiﬁcant impact on
growth, policy outcomes and institutional change.
The study of leadership and change has been pursued in much greater detail in disciplines
other than economics. For instance, the study of leadership is a central theme in many studies of
organization behavior and management (see Bass(1990) and House and Aditya (1997), Northouse
(2004)). Similarly, it has been explored in political science (Burns, 1978), international relations
(Young, 1991) and social psychology (Van Vugt and De Cremer (1999)), among other ﬁelds.
We start by describing the elements of the basic model in the next section. In Section 3.1 we
analyze the equilibrium when the preferences of the leader and the populace are congruent. We
relax this assumption in Section 3.2 in the case where there are two groups, with the leader-follower
preferences being not perfectly aligned. Applications are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5
details some particular instances of leadership and change. We conclude with a discussion in
Section 6.
2 The Model
We develop a simple model to capture the two-way relationship between followers and a leader and
the impact of this relationship on successfully engendering change. The model consists of three
main elements: one, the mechanism for successful change which requires coordinated action under
the right circumstances; two, leadership, which consists of identifying suitable opportunities for
change and spurring individuals to take advantage of such opportunities; three, followership, which
is characterized by the degree of individuals’ responses to a leader’s call for action. A key aspect
of our framework is the interdependence between the followers’ demand for leadership and the
leader’s supply of leadership, which together help determine the probability of successful change.
Information and Coordination:
While many policy changes such as an increase or decrease of the tax rate, can be unilaterally
implemented by a leader or manager through ﬁat, broad-based economic, institutional, organiza-
tional or social change is far more diﬃcult to achieve. Such change often requires a coordinated
switch in the beliefs and/or actions of a large number of individuals with possibly diﬀering pref-
erences, costs and priors. Such coordination is typically diﬃcult to achieve. Not only does an
individual agent lack information about whether other agents also plan to switch their actions,
but further may even be uncertain about whether the underlying conditions are such that change
is optimal to begin with.
To capture uncertainty about whether or not the underlying conditions are appropriate for
change, we assume that there are three states of nature: B,G0 and G1. State B is one in which
change is never possible. We assume that in state B, even a coordinated change of actions will
6not only never succeed, but also results in all participants (including the leader) becoming worse
oﬀ, earning a very large negative utility.6 This is meant to capture the idea that under some
conditions, any attempt at change is futile and costly and should not be undertaken.
In states G0 and G1, change is possible, but requires coordinated mass action. We assume that
the probability of change in either of these states is given by 1
θp.mθ,w h e r em is the fraction of the
populace participating in the process, θ>0, and p ∈ (0,1) is a parameter that captures the degree
of uncertainty that is inherent in the process. This formulation captures in a stylized manner two
plausible aspects of the process of regime change — one, that it is stochastic and two, it is more
likely to occur when there are more active participants. The parameter θ captures the impact of
the degree of complementarity amongst the participants on the probability of successful change.
For a smaller θ, the marginal product of increased participation m is also larger. For simplicity,
i nm o s to ft h ea n a l y s i st h a tf o l l o w s ,w ea s s u m eθ =1and thus the probability of change equals
p.m. In section 3.1.1, we discuss the eﬀect of θ diﬀerent from 1 on the qualitative results.
While change is possible in both states G0 and G1,t h e yd i ﬀer in terms of the distributional
consequences of successful change. The population is assumed to belong to one of two groups —
the majority (group M)o rt h ee l i t e( g r o u pE). State G1 is a situation in which the gains from
successful change are widely spread and accrue to any individual who is an active participant in the
process, irrespective of his or her group. In this state, we denote by G>0 the gain from successful
change to a participant from either group; for non-participants, this is zero. In contrast, in the
state G0, the gains from change accrue to a much narrower segment of the population, namely,
only to participants from the elite group E. In this state, while participants from the majority
group incur the cost and raise the chances of success, they enjoy none of the gains from change.
Here, the gains from successful change G accrue only to participants from group E. Alignment
(or not) of interests between the leader and each of the groups will have important consequences
for his credibility and the resulting degree of followership. For simplicity, we assume that the
elite group is of zero mass (while the majority is of mass 1). We will discuss below how relaxing
this assumption does not qualitatively aﬀect most of our results (footnote 17 contains the overall
equilibrium condition in the case of a small but non-zero mass of group E).
W h i l ew eh a v en o r m a l i z e dt h ep a y o ﬀs from maintaining the status-quo as 0, we have also
taken the gains to non-participants from successful change as being 0. This is largely to reduce
unnecessary notation. The analysis would not change if alternately, one denoted the gains to non-
participants from successful change by say ∆, and G as the gains over and above ∆ that is enjoyed
by those participating in the process of change. Such gains could be psychological, arising for
instance from the satisfaction of participating in the overthrow of a hated autocrat, or material, in
the form of membership of a political party, the recognition of being a “freedom ﬁghter” or being
6For example, not only was the Shiite rebellion in Southern Iraq unsuccessful in overthrowing the Baathist regime,
but it resulted in the execution of the leaders and the massacre of many of the followers.
7the adopter of a successful social norm or technology.
T h e( c o m m o n )p r i o r sa r e1−α on the state being B (i.e. on the situation not being conducive
to change), and αa on the state being G1 and α(1 − a) on it being G0. Thus when a is higher,
there is an increasing probability of the coincidence of objectives between the two groups.
While change is possible in some states and not in others, at an individual level what makes
it particularly diﬃcult is the lack of information about the underlying state of the world. In
the absence of information, the large downside if the underlying state turns out to be B,m a k e s
individuals stick to the status quo, resulting in institutional persistence. This is where we introduce
a role for a leader.
Leadership and Information:
While the general populace lacks information about the underlying state of the world, we as-
sume that there is an exogenously given leader who is in a position to invest in acquiring such
information. For instance, in the case of political change, it could be information that the ruling
regime is currently weak and vulnerable, or in the instance of economic reform, it could be about
the state of the global market. However, ascertaining whether there exists a suitable ‘window of
opportunity’ is not easy for the leader to do (Hirshman, 1970).7 It requires a mixture of skill and
eﬀort. Accordingly we assume that if the leader expends resources e(i)=li2/2, then with proba-
bility i he learns perfectly the state of nature, while with probability 1−i, he learns nothing. On
learning of a right opportunity, the leader next needs to convey this information to the populace
each of whom then decide on their personal course of action. To capture the ability of the leader
at communication, we denote by τ ∈ (0,1) the probability that any member of the population
receives the leader’s message. The population is assumed to be a continuum so that equivalently
τ is also the fraction of the population that receives the leader’s message. Thus the ability of the
leader is captured by his ability in identifying the right opportunities (smaller l) and his ability in
eﬀectively communicating his information to the populace (higher τ).
While we have ostensibly modeled the leader’s action here as acquiring information about the
underlying state, it is also meant to capture other aspects of leadership such as communicating and
persuading others that the underlying conditions are right for attempting change. Thus one could
alternately assume (with similar qualitative results) that the leader’s choice variable is the amount
of eﬀort he spends at communicating information to the followers, with i being the fraction of the
populace that receives his message if he expends resources e(i).
A second aspect of the model also deserves comment. While the leader here is one by virtue of
7Indeed, Hirshman (1970) would argue that it is an essential aspect of leadership. For instance, when discussing
the example of Carols Lleras Restrepo, Colombia’s ‘reform-mongering’ President in the sixties, he argued that good
leaders have “the ability to perceive change when most of one’s contemporaries are still unable to do so.... that
would enable a leader to take advantage of new opportunities as soon as they arise.”
8his position i.e. he is the only one in a position to acquire information, this does not automatically
allow him to impart leadership and bring about change. As we shall see below, the leader’s power
at eﬀecting action and hence leadership is crucially dependent on the responsiveness of his followers
and also of the non-followers. Under certain circumstances, any attempt at eﬀecting change by
the leader will be met with zero response and no leadership will be possible.
In this formulation, the main role of the leader is to acquire information about the appropriate
state of the world and then convey it to the populace. To capture the leader’s incentives in
the simplest manner, we denote by Ls the leader’s payoﬀ from successful change in state Gs,
s ∈ {0,1}. This payoﬀ may involve either a monetary payoﬀ or some ‘ego rents’ that accrue
from successful change and the consequences thereof in terms of political oﬃce etc. We make the
following restriction on gains Ls and costs l so as to ensure that the choice variable i (which is the
probability that the leader acquires information about the present state) is always less than 1.
Assumption 1: αpτLs <l
Given that there are two groups in the economy, the majority and elite, the leader’s interests
could be aligned with one group or the other. Notice that the above formulation allows us to also
capture such diﬀerences in preferences. A “benevolent” or “non-partisan” leader here is one who
cares about the welfare of the majority and thus would like to see change coming about only in
state G1 where the beneﬁts are wide-spread and accrue to all groups. Thus for such a leader we
assume that L1 > 0 while L0 =0 . On the other hand, a leader may have preferences aligned with
the narrow elite. Such a “self-interested” or “elitist” leader may have a personal agenda under
which he would like to see change enacted even in state G0, where only the elite gain while all
bear the cost. Accordingly, such a leader gains from change in both the states, i.e. L1 > 0 and
L0 > 0. In our analysis below, we will in turn consider each of these two types of leaders.
Here, bringing about successful change requires coordinated participation in the process by a
large number of individuals. Next we describe the costs and beneﬁts from participation.
Followership:
There exists a unit mass of individuals, some of whom may choose to participate in the process of
changing the status-quo or not. While participation holds the promise of a reward, it also involves
incurring some costs. The degree of an individual’s response to a call for action by the leader
w i l lo b v i o u s l yd e p e n do nh e rc o s to fp a r t i c i p a t i o na sw e l la st h ep e r c e i v e db e n e ﬁts. To naturally
introduce followership in the form of a greater degree of responsiveness to the leader’s message,
we assume that individuals can ex-ante invest in lowering their ex-post cost of participation.
Individuals who make this investment are more likely to have a lower participation cost in the
future and are thus more likely to act when called upon to do so by the leader. In other words,
such individuals are “followers”.8
8All that is required is that the payoﬀ (in expected terms) is higher, the earlier an individual makes a commitment.
9Depending on the context, these participation costs may take diﬀerent forms. For instance,
an attempt to bring about a revolution against an autocratic government requires individuals to
make costly investments — from setting up the political opposition, organizing political parties and
meetings, street protests to even the opportunity (and physical) cost of an arrest. Furthermore,
in this case undergoing arms or ideological training, organizing one’s matters and forsaking other
avenues of employment so as to be able to easily participate in the revolution can be interpreted
as early investment in followership. Alternatively, a country’s attempt at liberalizing the economy
or joining the WTO is likely to be successful if domestic ﬁrms have already made the costly
investment to modernize and increase productivity. Given any convexity in adjustment costs,
ﬁrms that upgrade their technology early instead of waiting till the end moment, are likely to have
much lower adjustment costs, and consequently a higher overall payoﬀ.
In terms of the model, we assume that with probability y, the personal cost c of participating
in the process is 0, a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − y, this cost c is drawn from a uniform distribution
with support [0,c H]. We will assume that cH is high enough so that not all people participate in
the process of change even in the best possible circumstances:
Assumption 2: pτG < cH
However, as discussed above, individuals can also make a costly ex-ante investment to lower
their cost of participating and beneﬁting from change ex-post. Accordingly, we assume that people
can invest before-hand in y i.e. in lowering their cost of participation ex-post if called upon to do
so. The cost of investing y is given by f(y)=ky2/2.
This formulation provides us with a simple way to distinguish between followers and other
participants. We label as “followers” those individuals with a low cost c =0of participation in
any change, as they participate whenever called upon to do so by the leader. On the other hand,
individuals with costs drawn between 0 and cH decide whether or not to participate depending on
their own realized costs as well as their expectations of the movement succeeding - these are the
“non-followers”. Thus, while a fraction of this group may participate in the process, their decision
to follow the leader’s call for action is not automatic and is contingent on other factors.
Dramatic institutional change such as the onset of democracy, the extension of civil rights or
revolution of any kind typically requires numerous participants. This distinction between “fol-
lowers” and the “non-follower” participants is a simple way to emphasize the diﬀerences between
diﬀerent kinds of participants that is common in many social and political movements for change.
The “followers” can be considered to be the committed and loyal supporters who oﬀer uncondi-
tional support to the leader and play a pivotal role in spurring the leader towards action.9 De-
This payoﬀ can be either pecuniary or even non-pecuniary in the form of more status and authority post-regime
change.
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Figure 1: Timing of events
pending on the kind of change being analyzed, these ‘followers’ can be members of the Mandela’s
African National Congress, Lenin’s Bolshevik Party or Jack Welch’s ‘varsity team’ of managers.
Timing of events. The following is the timing of events. Initially, at date T =0 , each member
of the population decides how much y to invest in reducing his or her cost of participation. A
higher y at this stage denotes a greater degree of followership, as one is then more likely to respond
positively to the leader’s call for participation. The state of the world is subsequently realized, and
at date T =1the leader invests i in acquiring information about it. If he receives information, the
leader communicates this information to the populace. People’s personal costs of participation are
then realized, and at T =2 , each decides whether or not to participate in the process of bringing
about change. Depending on the state of the world and the number of people participating, change
occurs or not and payoﬀs are realized.
Figure 1 gives a diagrammatic depiction of this timing of events.
3 Leadership and Change: Equilibrium Analysis
As pointed out earlier, the framework described above seeks to capture the dynamic between a
leader and his/her followers and its overall consequences for large scale change such as economic
reform, institutional and organizational transformation. In determining the leader’s eﬀectiveness
at catalyzing change, one has to account for not just his ability but also his preferences. An
individual or group’s decision on whether or not to become a follower and/or respond to the
directives of a leader may well depend on whether the leader is perceived to have objectives
congruent with theirs or not. As described above, depending on the value of L0,t h el e a d e rm a y
early as 1921. When talking about the Storm troopers, Hitler said “the young movement was to supply what the
others lacked: a volkisch movement with a strictly public base, including the broadest masses, welded together by
iron-hard organization, ﬁlled with blind obedience and inspired with brutal determination, a party of battle and
action.” For instance, Hitler’s Storm troopers could be either encouraged or “restrain(ed) from action or violence if
it seemed advantageous.” (Willner, 1984, pp. 184).
11have objectives aligned with that of the majority or with those of the minority elite. In our analysis
below, we consider each case separately.
3.1 Leadership and Followership under Congruent Preferences
We begin by exploring the leader-follower dynamic in the case where there is perfect alignment
of preferences of the leader with those of the majority i.e. the case of a benevolent leader. This
congruence of preferences may arise either because the leader belongs to the group M or because
he is benevolent or because the underlying political considerations force the leader to only take
into account the welfare of the majority. For example, if the gains to the leader come from a longer
term in oﬃce following a successful change and the institutional framework gives the majority M
the power to determine who is in oﬃce, this will imply a closer congruence in objectives of the
leader with those of the majority.
In this case, both the leader and the majority can potentially gain if the state is G1, but not
if it is G0 or B. To not introduce additional issues of imperfect information, we assume that the
preferences of the leader are common knowledge.
Participation: In analyzing the equilibrium of the above game, let us start from the second period
where each individual knows his own opportunity cost of participation c and decides whether or
not to participate. For an individual who has not received any message from the leader, given that
there is an inﬁnite negative cost to attacking in a bad state, he will not participate irrespective of
his cost.
Thus the only consideration is for individuals who have received message of a good state from
the leader. Since the leader here is a benevolent one, all such individuals will infer that the state
must be G1 as a benevolent leader will never issue a call for action in states B or G0. If this
individual faces zero cost of participation, as is the case for a committed follower, he will indeed
do so. For an individual with a positive cost c, he will have to weigh the costs and beneﬁts
from participation in making his decision. If his expectation about how many other people will
participate is me, this individual will also choose to participate only if c ≤ pGme. Thus the
marginal participant is one whose cost of participation is given by
c∗ = pGme
Given the leader’s ability τ at communicating his message, a fraction τ of the populace receives
it. Of this, a fraction y are committed followers and have zero realized cost of participation and
surely do so; among the remaining, only those with costs less than c∗ participate. Thus aggregating
across all individuals, the total mass of people who participate in the process is given by:




12In equilibrium, individual expectations about aggregate participation are realized. Thus, equating
the above two equations gives the equilibrium cut-oﬀ cost c∗ for participation:




For any given y>0, this condition determines c∗. The following proposition shows that c∗ is
unique and analyzes some of its properties.
Proposition 1 For any given y>0, there is a unique level of participation c∗, which is determined
from equation (1). Increases in y, τ, p or G or a decrease in cH raise the probability of change in
state G1.
Proof. See Appendix.
An increase in the number of followers y or a better ability to communicate by the leader τ or a
decrease in cH raise the mass of participants for a given c∗, thus raising the chances of success. This
encourages more marginal participants thereby raising c∗. Similarly, an increase in the probability
of success p or in the gains from success G raises directly the payoﬀ from participation and hence
leads to an increase in c∗. As the overall probability of change is related to the total mass of
participants in the process, variations in the underlying parameters that raise c∗ also serve to
increase the probability of successful change in state G1.
It is interesting to note some additional features of this solution. As y increases, c∗ increases.
In other words, as the number of committed followers increase, so too does participation by the
rest of the population. Thus there is complementarity between followers and mass participation.
Note that when y =0 , the only equilibrium involves c∗ =0i.e. no possibility of change10.T h u sa
core group of committed followers is necessary to have any positive chance of successful change.
The leader’s expertise at communication, τ, also plays a crucial part in this relation. As each
individual expects a more communicative leader in the sense of his message reaching more people,
each is more encouraged to participate and thus overall there is greater participation in bringing
about change. The nature of this dynamic between the leader and the populace will also be evident
in our analysis of leadership and followership below.
Leadership:N e x tw em o v eb a c kt ot h ep e r i o dT =1where the leader decides on how much eﬀort
i to devote in discovering the underlying state. If the benevolent leader uncovers no information
or discovers that the conditions are not right (i.e. in states G0 or B), he will not send out any
message urging people to participate as there is zero probability of success. On the other hand
if the underlying state is good (i.e. G1), the leader issues a call to initiate change. Of course,
10This is because under Assumption 2, the equilibrium condition pτG
c∗
cH = c
∗ cannot hold for any c
∗ ∈ (0,c H].
13whether or not people will act on the leader’s message depends on their own personal costs as well
as their expectation about action by others (as described above).
Taking the participation decision of the populace in response to a call for action as given, the
leader chooses his eﬀort i at discovering the underlying state to maximize
αaipmeL1 − e(i)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the problem yields:
αapmeL1 = αapτ[y +( 1− y)
c∗
cH
]L1 = li (2)
As the leader expects a greater degree of response me by the populace to his message, it encourages
him to expend more resources in discovering the underlying state. In other words, the supply of
leadership is increasing in the number of “committed” followers y as well as the expected partici-
pation of the general populace (given by c∗). Furthermore, the leader’s eﬀort is also increasing in
the rewards from change, either for himself (a higher L1) or for the participants (via an increase
in c∗) or an increase in his communication-ability (τ).The eﬀects here can be both direct as well
as indirect. For instance, a leader with a higher ability at communication (i.e. a higher τ) ﬁnds it
directly worthwhile to expend more eﬀort as he can reach a wider audience in case of discovering
a suitable opportunity for change. There is an indirect eﬀect at work as well; expectations of a
larger fraction of the population receiving the leader’s message encourages increased participation
by non-followers (i.e. a higher c∗), which again feeds back to the leader investing more in i.
Followership: Finally, we move back to the initial period T =0to analyze the decision by
individuals to invest resources y in becoming followers. Recall that a higher y lowers the expected
cost of participation in the future, and thus by investing in y, people commit themselves to more
closely following the leader when called upon to do so. Of course, this decision to invest in y
depends on the expectations about the outcomes to follow in the subsequent periods.
In this game, there always exists a no-action status-quo equilibrium in which no one invests in
y i.e. everyone chooses y =0 , following which (from (1)) c∗ =0i.e. no one participates, and i =0 .
Anticipating this, choosing y =0in the initial stage is a rational response. In this equilibrium,
there is no probability of change and the status-quo is retained.
To investigate interior equilibria involving a non-zero degree of followership, let us ﬁrst compute
the expected payoﬀ to an individual from investing y. In period T =2 , one will participate in the
process of change only if one receives the leader’s message (which only occurs in state G1, which
the leader uncovers with probability i) and if her cost of participation is either 0 or below c∗.
Investing in followership i.e. a higher y, helps lower the expected participation cost in the future.
With probability y, this cost is 0, while with probability 1−y it is distributed between 0 and cH.
14Denoting by V the expected gains from participating, an individual’s payoﬀ from investing y is
thus:














as V = pmeG = c∗ (from (1)).





Note that for any given level of participation c∗, the degree of followership y is increasing in
the anticipated degree of leadership i that is expected from the leader. As analyzed in equation
(2), the feedback is in fact two way; a higher degree of followership y has a positive eﬀect on
the resources i that is put forth by the leader also. Secondly, as discussed before, an increased
number of committed followers encourages participation by the rest of the populace. However, as
the above equation shows, there is a reverse eﬀect too: as c∗ increases i.e. as general participation
rises (thereby increasing the chances of success), it enhances the incentives for any individual to
become a committed follower.
Incorporating from (2) that i = αapτ[y +( 1− y) c∗
cH]L1/l = αaL1
lG c∗, the above condition







Now, given that the population is a continuum, if each individual invests y in followership,
then y is also the fraction of the population with realized cost of participation c =0i.e. it is the
fraction of committed followers. As analyzed before, for a given level of followership y,t h ed e g r e e
of participation by the general populace is given by the equilibrium condition (1):














Thus, together conditions (5) and (6) determine equilibrium for the model. Using (6) to replace

















15Solution(s) to this equation (if any) determine equilibria for the overall game. Clearly c∗ =0
(i.e. one where no one becomes a follower, the leader expends no eﬀort and overall there is zero
probability of change), is an equilibrium. However, there can be interior equilibria too. The













then the only equilibrium for the overall game is where no one becomes a follower i.e. y =0 , and
i =0and there is no possibility of change. On the other hand, if this condition does not hold,
then there are two interior equilibria in addition to the no action equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition demonstrates that the overall equilibrium to the game can be one of two
kinds. First, there always exists a degenerate status-quo equilibrium where there is no possibility
of regime change. Under some circumstances, it is the only equilibrium. As condition (8) shows,
this will be the case when the general prior α about the prospects for change is highly pessimistic,
or the leader is of poor quality in terms of his ability at gathering information or communicating
it, or when the perceived gains from change G are relatively low. In all other circumstances, the
above proposition points out the possibility of multiple interior equilibria. Typically, there are
two such. One is a high probability-of-change equilibrium involving a high level of followership y,
ah i g hd e g r e eo fe ﬀort by the leader i, and a good amount of participation even by the contingent
followers. At the same time, there also exists a low-level equilibrium with few becoming committed
followers as well as less eﬀort by the leader. In this case there is a relatively low (but non-zero)
possibility of change.
While the Appendix gives the formal proof of the proposition, its intuition can be seen from
the ﬁgures 2(a) and (b). Equation (1) gives the degree of participation c∗ by non-followers for a
given level of followership y, and is represented by the increasing curve P in ﬁgure 2(a). On the
other hand, investment in followership y for a given level of participation c∗ and leadership eﬀort
i is given by equation (4) and is represented by the curve F in ﬁgure 2(a). The intersection of
these two curves gives overall equilibrium for the model. Thus if the situation is as in case 1 of
the ﬁgure, the only intersection is at c∗ =0and the only equilibrium for the game involves no
change. On the other hand, in case 2, there are two interior equilibria in addition to the status-quo
equilibrium. To determine the precise condition for each case, one needs to take into account the
relative speed of change of the two curves; equation (7) incorporates this. Eliminating a c∗ from
both sides of the equation, the left-hand side of the equation is inverse U-shaped in c∗, as depicted











Figure 2: Overall equilibrium
right hand side lies above or below the highest point of the inverse U, there is either no interior
equilibrium or two such. This is captured by the condition (8).
The multiple interior equilibria is the result of the interaction between the leader, the followers
and the non-followers. As more people invest in becoming followers, thus committing themselves
to taking action whenever called upon to do so by the leader, it increases the incentives for the
leader as well as increases participation by non-followers. Knowing that more people will act upon
getting his message, the leader puts in more eﬀort into discovering the right conditions for change,
thus raising the overall chances of success. This increased chance of success encourages more
people to invest in followership in the ﬁrst place. It is the two-way feedback between followership,
leadership and participation that thus leads to one equilibrium involving a high degree of all
three and another with low degrees of all. Among the three equilibria (in case 2), the status
quo equilibrium and the equilibrium with the highest level of c∗ are stable, while the middle one
involving moderate levels of followership, participation and change is unstable.11
A second implication of the above proposition is that it demonstrates the possibility of en-
dogenous threshold eﬀects for eﬀective leadership. If the leader’s ability is below an endogenous
threshold (i.e. if l is large or τ is small so that condition (8) holds), the probability of the leader
catalyzing change is zero. The probability of eﬀecting change as a function of ability is depicted
in ﬁgure 3 below (in the multiple equilibria case, we consider the Pareto-dominant (and stable)
equilibrium i.e. the one with the higher c∗). Only a leader who is of a suﬃciently high ability
11This can be seen from ﬁgure 2(a); at the middle equilibrium, consider a slight increase in y.F r o m (P), this
translates into an increase in participation c
∗, which feeds back into increased followership y through the followership
curve (F). The resulting feedback is in fact greater than the initial increase in y, implying that the overall dynamics
move away from this equilibrium. On the other hand, its the opposite case for the status quo equilibrium and the
equilibrium with the highest level of c
∗ i.e. these two are stable.
17in discovering underlying conditions and communicating them to the population will have any
chance of being successful in changing the status-quo regime. What is somewhat surprising about
this result is that the threshold eﬀect comes about in spite of all the underlying variables being
continuous. To see the underlying intuition observe that there is strategic complementarity not
only between the individuals in the population, but also between the individuals and the leader.
If the leader’s ability is low, then the expected returns from investment in followership for any
individual is likely to be modest. These modest returns to change result in a collapse all through-
out via two channels. Firstly, here slight increases in the number of committed followers have
an e g l i g i b l ee ﬀect on participation by the non-followers (we discuss this channel in more detail
in section 3.1.1 below) and thereby on the overall chances of success. Second is the leadership
channel, where a leader of high ability requires a lower degree of followership to be spurred into
action. For a leader with lower ability to exert the same level of eﬀort requires a higher degree
of expected participation, which of course does not happen. A leader of high ability helps resolve
this coordination failure by making successful outcome to each individual’s investment much less
dependent on the actions of others. No longer hostage to the investment decisions of others, each
individual responds by undertaking the costly investment to facilitate change. This direct eﬀect
is reinforced by the positive spillover that arises due to the strategic complementarity in actions
resulting in a coordinated switch by individuals investing toward change. In terms of ﬁgure 2(a),
it is perhaps easiest to understand the intuition for the above result in terms of the leader’s ability
variable l. Changes in l do not aﬀect the P curve. Note that the P curve represents the par-
ticipation decision of non-followers which takes place after uncovering of the state by the leader
and therefore this decision is unaﬀected by l. On the other hand, the F curve represents ex-ante
investment in followership conditional on a certain degree of participation by non-followers. A
lowering of l implies increased initiative i by the leader for any given level of participation c∗, and
thereby encourages increased followership y. In other words, the F curve shifts upward and thus
it is more likely for case 2 (comprising interior equilibria) to arise.
An implication of this result is that ‘small’ diﬀerences in the leader’s ability can have dra-
matic eﬀects on the probability of regime change. Together with the multiple interior equilibrium
phenomenon, it also suggests why the role of leadership in aﬀecting real outcomes may be quite
diﬃcult to empirically disentangle.
This result also throws light on two related debates. First, the debate regarding the role of
institutions in driving economic growth. As has been pointed out by Besley (2006) among others,
political institutions are important in part because they determine both the average quality of
leadership as well as its variance. Our analysis here suggests that small diﬀerences in leadership
quality may turn out to be of ﬁrst-order importance in determining whether or not large scale
changes happen. Thus, even small diﬀerences in underlying institutions leading to small diﬀerences





Figure 3: Eﬀect of leader’s ability on the probability of bringing about change
debate among social scientists on whether historical outcomes are driven by underlying structural
conditions (Tolstoy) or by the ‘Great Man’ (Carlyle). While the model in this paper emphasizes
the ‘Great Man’ theory of history, it suggests that both structural conditions and leadership are
important. This is because while for a leader to be eﬀective, the conditions have to be right — in
the form of a suﬃciently optimistic prior about the prospects for change and the gains thereof.
3.1.1 Leadership and Threshold Eﬀects: the Role of Complementarity
How does the degree of complementarity in individual participation decisions matter for the equi-
librium and therefore for the overall probability of successful change? In addressing this question,
we revert to the general formulation, where the probability of change in both states is given by
1
θpmθ,w i t hθ>0. Recall that the parameter θ now captures the degree of complementarity in
the process, as a smaller θ corresponds to a higher marginal product of increased participation m.
The structure of the game is the same as before except that (similar to Assumption 2), we now
assume:
Assumption 20: pτG < θcH
The analysis of the participation decision, the degree of leadership eﬀort exerted and the in-
vestment into followership is very similar to that above and are derived in the Appendix. Together,























Clearly c∗ =0(i.e. one where no one becomes a follower, the leader expends no eﬀort and overall
there is zero probability of change), is an equilibrium now too. Looking for interior equilibria, the
left hand side of (9) is the same as that of (7). However the right-hand side is now diﬀerent and the
19interior equilibria in some cases will now be unique and there will be no threshold requirements for
leadership to be eﬀective. The following Corollary to Proposition 2 analyzes this in more detail.
Corollary 1 For θ<1, in addition to the status-quo equilibrium, there always exists an interior
equilibrium with a positive probability of change. For θ ≥ 1, there exists a range of parameters
under which the status-quo is the only equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that when θ is low, there always exists an interior equilibrium. This
is in contrast to the case studied earlier where if condition (8) holds, the only equilibrium is the
no-action one. In terms of leadership, this implies that in the case where θ is less than 1,t h e r e
are no abrupt changes in the eﬀectiveness of the leader. In other words, over the entire range of
leadership ability l or τ,small changes in the leader’s ability or in any of the underlying parameters
result only in a small change in the probability of successful change. On the other hand, when
strategic complementarity is high i.e. θ ≥ 1, there exists thresholds similar to condition (8) that
must be satisﬁed for a leader to be eﬀective.
The underlying intuition for this diﬀerence stems primarily from the complementarity between
the individuals in the population which translates into a strategic complementarity between the
committed followers, non-followers and the leader. When θ<1, slight increases in the number
of followers (at y =0 )results in a big increase in the participation of non-followers, thus overall
leading to a substantial increase in the mass of participants. Together this implies that a small
increase in followership also results in a signiﬁcant improvement to the leader’s incentive in light of
the expected change in overall participation. On the other hand when θ ≥ 1, a marginal increase
in y (at y =0 )results only in a small marginal increase in the overall number of participants and
thus is not enough to spur the leader into putting in more eﬀort. In this case only a leader of
suﬃciently high ability helps resolve this coordination failure by making successful outcome to each
individual’s investment much less dependent on the actions of others. Thus, when θ ≥ 1, there
exist thresholds in terms of the leader’s ability and the other underlying parameters for leadership
to be eﬀective, while when θ<1, even for low ability leaders, the probability of bringing about
change is positive, albeit small.
3.2 Leaders and Followers under Imperfectly Congruent Preferences
The analysis above was for a leader whose preferences for change are perfectly aligned with that
of the majority. While this may be true in some instances, it need not always be the case and the
leader may have his or her own agenda for change separate from that desired by the majority. We
now explore this possibility.
20When the leader is known to have interests aligned with that of a particular group, individuals
in this group do not have any reason to suspect his motives when he issues a call for action.
However, in many situations this will not be the case. The leader may belong to a diﬀerent class,
ethnicity or religious group whose preferences for change could be diﬀerent. For instance, a Shiite
leader’s call to arms with the aim of overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq may be viewed very
diﬀerently by a Sunni than a Shiite. More generally, in many instances it is quite likely that the
realized institutional change that occurred ex-post was not what was desired ex-ante by followers
of Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Kabila in Zaire or even the Bolsheviks in revolutionary Russia.
Accordingly, we now analyze the case where the leader may belong to group E and thus his
preferences for change need not always coincide with that of the majority group M. In particular,
we assume that the leader’s initial reputation for having preferences congruent with group M i.e.
that the leader is ‘benevolent’ is given by λ ∈ (0,1).
Recall that in state G0, while all participants gain from successful change, in state G1, only
participants from group E gain; those from group M gain nothing but incur the cost of participa-
tion c. For a leader whose interests are aligned with members of group E we assume that L1 > 0
as well as L0 > 0, so that it is optimal for him to issue a call for action in state G1 as well as in
state G0. Recall that the ex-ante prior on the state being B is given by 1 − α, w h i l et h a to ni t
being G1 is αa and on it being G0 is α(1−a). As a gets higher, there is an increasing coincidence
of objectives between the two groups and also between a group E leader and the majority.
Here, while a leader who belongs to group E issues a call for action both in states G0 and
G1, benevolent non-partisan leaders do so only in state G1. Thus upon receiving a message from
the leader, people in group M are no longer sure about the credibility of it. More precisely, on
receiving a message, their updated probability about the state being G1 is given by:
Prob(G1|message)=b a =
a
a +( 1− λ)(1 − a)
As expected this is increasing in λ, the probability that the leader is of the benevolent kind. While
all committed followers participate (as their cost of doing so is 0), among the non-followers only
those with low enough costs do so. This cutoﬀ cost c∗ is now given by:




As λ increases, b a increases, and this equation implies that as a result c∗ also rises. In other words,
an increase in λ raises credibility of the leader (in the sense that he is more likely to have interests
aligned with that of the majority) and thus results in greater participation by the populace.
To study the eﬀort put in by the leader, let us ﬁrst look at a leader of the benevolent type.
This leader issues a call for action and gains only in the state G1; thus, taking the expected mass





Figure 4: Eﬀect of λ on the probability of change in state GM
with the ﬁrst-order condition:
αapmeL1 = lib
For the self-interested leader the gains come about both in states G0 and G1 and thus the ﬁrst-order
condition characterizing his eﬀort is is given by:
αpτme(aL1 +( 1− a)L0)=lis
Comparing the two equations we see that is =( 1+1−a
a
L0
L1)ib. Since the self-interested leader has
more opportunities for gain, he puts in more eﬀort at gathering information. This sets up the
basic trade-oﬀ here: while a benevolent leader is more credible (the ‘credibility eﬀect’) and elicits
more response to his message, a self-interested leader puts in more eﬀort (the ‘motivation eﬀect’)
and is thus more likely to uncover suitable conditions for change such as G1 (as well as G0).
For simplicity in exposition, we assume L0 = L1 = L, thus implying ib = ais. From an ex-
ante perspective, the probability of successful change occurring in state G1 (under a leader with
reputation λ) is given by:








where in equilibrium the expected mass of people participating is given by me = τ[y +(1−y) c∗
cH].
P1 encompasses the two above-mentioned eﬀects at work: as λ rises, the expected eﬀort put in
by the leader, λa +1− λ, falls, while due to increased credibility, participation conditional on
receiving a message, [y +(1−y) c∗
cH], rises. The following proposition derives the overall impact of
λ on the probability of successful change in state G1.
Proposition 3 For b a< cH
3(1−y)pGτ,P 1 is decreasing in λ, while for b a> cH
3(1−y)pGτ,P 1 is increasing
in λ.
22Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition establishes that the leader’s type has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the
probability of bringing about change in the state G1 where the leader and the majority of the
population both beneﬁt from change. This is depicted in ﬁgure 4. For low values of λ, the eﬀect of
an increase in λ is to lower the probability of change, while beyond a certain cutoﬀ,t h i se ﬀect is
positive. Recall that the leader’s type λ has two possible eﬀects on P1: one, through its negative
eﬀect on expected eﬀort and second, through its positive eﬀect on credibility. While the negative
eﬀect on the leader’s initiative aﬀects followers and non-followers alike, the positive credibility
eﬀect is important only for the non-followers who are more likely to participate upon hearing a
more credible leader’s call for action. When λ is low, the leader’s credibility is low and not many
non-followers participate in any case. Thus with an increase in λ, the positive credibility eﬀect
impacts only a small group while the negative initiative eﬀect has an impact on everyone; hence
when λ is small, the overall eﬀect of an increase in λ is to lower the probability of change.
The turning point of the above function is at λ = cH
3(1−y)pGτ and it is interesting to note the
eﬀect of the parameters on it. As y increases, this turning point increases. In other words, as the
number of followers increases, the eﬀect of increased λ is negative over a bigger range. The reason
is that credibility is not an issue for followers; since their cost of participation is 0, they always do
so. For them, the main eﬀe c ti sd u et ot h ee ﬀort put in by the leader. An increase in λ lowers the
expected eﬀort and is thus less likely to lead to the possibility of change.
The above analysis is of course contingent on a given level of followership y and shows that a
higher ex-ante probability of the leader being a benevolent type need not always translate into a
greater probability of change even in the state where everyone beneﬁts from change. The analysis
shows in a very sharp way that a self-interested leader driven by ambition can become a great leader
and be a force for change. Most leaders in business responsible for organizational transformation
- from Jack Welch, Lee Iaccoca to Steve Jobs are driven by ambition. Indeed, arguably leaders
such as Winston Churchill, FDR and Lyndon Johnson transformed their environment by dint of
ambition, hard work and resourcefulness.
Endogenous Followership: We now consider the eﬀect of the leader’s type on followership and
consequently on the overall chances of change. Section 3.1 dealt with the case where the leader is
a benevolent type. For comparison, we now consider the diametric opposite case where the leader
is known to be of the self-interested type i.e. λ =0 .
In this case, b a = a and the marginal participant is given by: c∗ = apτ[y+(1−y) c∗
cH]G and the




At date T =0 , to evaluate the value of followership for an individual from group M, one needs
to calculate the date T =2expected gains in states G0 and G1. In either state, provided the
leader uncovers it and one receives the leader’s message, one will participate if either one’s cost is










while in state G1, they are given by:







where V is the expected gain to participating and is given by V = pτ[ye +( 1− ye) c∗
cH]G = c∗
a .

















Compared to the case of a benevolent leader, there is an added incentive for followership here,
namely the alignment of one’s interests with those of the leader. This is apparent in the state
G1; being a follower participant incurs zero loss as one’s cost of participation then is 0. Being a
non-follower participant however, one incurs the positive costs of participation c, without getting
any beneﬁt. Investing in followership thus reduces the expected loss in this situation. While we
have cast followership in the model in terms of a lower cost of participation, it could similarly be
modeled as investing into higher gains from change. Again, the incentive here is for a follower
to align one’s interests more closely with those of the leader (or his group) so as to reap greater
gains under all circumstances. For example, this could occur when by adopting a technology or
an occupation that is closer in line with that of the elite group E so as to achieve gains in both
states G1 as well as G0.
Weighing the marginal gain from increased investment in followership y against its marginal






























This expression is similar to the equilibrium condition for a benevolent leader (7). Thus in this
case too there are threshold eﬀects in the eﬀectiveness of leadership. The following proposition
compares the thresholds for a benevolent versus a self-interested leader.
24Proposition 4 If cH > 3
2pGτ, then for all a, the threshold level of ability l that is required for a
benevolent leader to be eﬀective is higher than that for a self-interested leader. If cH < 3
2pGτ, then
there exists a cutoﬀ level a∗ such that for a<a ∗, the threshold for eﬀective leadership is higher for
a benevolent leader, while for a>a ∗, the threshold is more stringent for a self-interested leader.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition establishes that when the ex-ante expected costs of participation (given
by cH/2) are high relative to the gains or when a the probability of the state G0 relative to that
for state G1 is low, a self-interested leader ﬁnds it easier in terms of the required ability level to
show eﬀective leadership as compared to a benevolent leader. When cH is large, the expected
costs of participation are high and thus there are strong ex-ante incentives for people to invest in
followership by reducing their ex-post participation cost. Even in the case where cH is not too
big, but a is low, an individual from group M faces a high chance of getting hurt by participating
in state G0; thus, such an individual has increased incentives to insulate himself by becoming a
follower. Under both these circumstances (i.e. a high cH and/or a low a), individuals’ incentive
to invest in followership is high. As discussed before, when the level of followers is high, a self-
interested leader is more likely to bring about change as compared to a benevolent one. Thus in
these cases, the threshold for eﬀectiveness leadership is higher for a benevolent leader.
While the above proposition compares the threshold levels of ability that need to be satisﬁed
by each type of leader to be eﬀective at bringing about change, the next question is for a given
level of ability l, what type of leader is preferred by each group? In other words, in ex-ante welfare
terms can it be that a self-interested leader may be preferred by the majority to a benevolent
one? The following proposition considers this issue. Of course, given multiple interior equilibria,
in making welfare comparisons, the choice of equilibria is important. In all cases, we consider the
Pareto-dominant one i.e. the one with the highest c∗.
Proposition 5 If cH > 3
2pGτ, the ex-ante welfare in the Pareto-dominant interior equilibrium (if
it exists) under a self-interested leader is higher than that under a benevolent leader of the same
ability. If cH < 3
2pGτ, then the above is true for small values of a.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that in terms of ex-ante welfare, there is a broad range of parameters
under which a self-interested leader would be preferred not only by the elite group E but also by
the majority M with whom it is known that the leader’s interests do not always coincide. Thus
even if one were to consider the issue of leader selection at the beginning of the game, it shows that
it is possible that the majority may wish to select a leader with objectives not always congruent
with theirs rather than one for whom it is.
25Again this result is due to the basic trade-oﬀ between a benevolent and a self-interested leader
in terms of credibility versus leadership eﬀort. For a given level of participation c∗, a self-interested
leader is always preferred as he puts in more eﬀort at discovering suitable conditions for change.
The level of participation c∗ however is contingent on two factors: one, credibility of the leader
and second, the number of committed followers. While the credibility of a self-interested leader is
lower, the incentive to invest in followership is higher under such a leader (due to the additional
gain from aligning one’s interest with that of the leader). If this second eﬀect is strong enough to
overshadow the credibility eﬀect, it will result in overall a higher level of participation c∗ under a
self-interested leader; thus both on the participation and leadership eﬀort counts, a self-interested
leader will be preferred to a benevolent one. When cH is high, the costs of participation are high
and therefore the incentive to invest in followership by reducing the expected participation cost
is strong per se. Even if cH is not too big, but a is small, there is a strong incentive to become
a follower in order to better align one’s interests with that of the leader. In both these cases, the
followership eﬀect overshadows the credibility eﬀect and as the above proposition shows, under
these circumstances a self-interested leader will ex-ante be preferred to a benevolent one.
The above proposition shows quite clearly why individuals may willingly choose to follow
leaders such as Hitler, Lenin or Robert Mugabe. For instance, citizens in Zimbabwe (or Iraq)
became members of the ZANU-PF party (or the Baath Party) not only to increase the direct
rewards from political transition, but also to insulate themselves from the adverse impact of any
changes that may occur under the control of their leaders.
4 Applications
4.1 Leadership: Expectations versus Reality
Is the leader’s eﬀectiveness at causing change a function of public perceptions or actual leader
ability? Addressing this issue can throw some light on the long-standing debate of whether change
is driven by actual leader ability (the ‘Great Man theory’) or is it that the underlying ‘spirit of
the times’ was ripe for change. In addressing these questions we also examine the robustness of
our results to allowing for a dispersion in beliefs in the population about underlying parameters,
such as the leader’s ability l or the prospects for change, α.
In the model so far, we have assumed that all individuals share a common belief about the
possibility for change α, about the congruence parameter a and know exactly the leader’s ability
l. It can be argued that in reality individuals may diﬀer in their perceptions about any or all of
these parameters. Rather, as emphasized by Morris and Shin (1998) and others, it is more than
likely that there is a heterogeneity in beliefs about underlying parameters. For instance, some
individuals may be more optimistic than others about the leader’s ability or underlying structural
26conditions. Accordingly, in what follows we capture a possible heterogeneity in beliefs by focusing
on dispersed perceptions about the leader’s ability.
In particular, suppose the leader’s ability l is not perfectly known, but is commonly believed
that this ability parameter is given by a random variable e l which is distributed over the interval
[l,l] according to the cdf F(e l), where l>l>α p τ L s. Equivalently, one could also assume that
there is a dispersion in beliefs about the leader’s ability, with F(e l) being the distribution of the
fraction of the population who believe the leader’s ability to be less than or equal to e l. The rest of
the game is the same as before. We will restrict our analysis to the case of the benevolent leader
only, as the analysis for the case of a selﬁsh leader is analogous.
Uncertainty about l does not aﬀect the participation decision in the second period, as this
decision is taken after the discovery of the state by the leader. Thus equation (1) still characterizes
participation of non-followers. Moving back to T =1 , the eﬀort decision e i for a leader of ability
e l depends on the expected mass of participants me in period T =2 , and is given by a condition
analogous to (2): e i = αapmeL1/e l.
At the initial period T =0 , the followership decision of an individual is related to the expected
eﬀort that will be put in by the leader E(e i) and is given by the condition12: y = αaτE(e i)[c∗ −
(c∗)2
2cH ]/k, which is analogous to equation (4). Now as before, incorporating the e i from the leader’s



















This is almost identical to equation (7) before, and therefore as in proposition 2, the condition for














Now observe that in the above condition, the leader’s actual ability l does not enter this inequality.
This has a striking implication, in that it suggests that the threshold for eﬀective leadership
depends solely on the public perception about the leader’s ability E(1/e l). In other words, even
a high ability leader who is publicly not perceived to be so will be unable to exercise eﬀective
leadership. Once the threshold is crossed however, the leader’s actual ability plays a positive role
in increasing the chances of change. In terms of ﬁgure 3, an increase in the leader’s actual ability
raises the non-zero part of the graph, but has no eﬀect on the threshold at which the probability
of change jumps discretely up from zero.
12In the case of dispersed beliefs, investment in followership by an individual who believes that the leader’s ability
is h l is given by: h y = αaτh i[c
∗ −
(c∗)2
2cH ]/k. Now, integrating over the whole population, the total mass of followers is




27Similarly, a dispersion in beliefs about the prospects for change, α, can also be accommodated
into the structure of the basic model. While individual beliefs e α aﬀect followership decisions, the
leader’s personal belief αL aﬀects his leadership initiative i. Together, these result in an analogous
















where E(e α) is the mean of the beliefs in the population. Again, as in proposition 2, if either αL
or E(e α) is too small, then the only equilibrium involves no change. Thus, the ‘spirit of the times’
matter in the sense that if the general outlook about the prospects for change are suﬃciently
optimistic, then the ability threshold for eﬀective leadership is small. In other words, in such a
situation, even a low ability leader has the possibility of eﬀecting change. On the other hand, in
the case of a highly pessimistic populace, even a leader of high ability may not be able to bring
about change.
In summary, both expectations as well as fundamentals matter for the exercise of eﬀective
leadership. The population’s perception of leader ability E(1/e l) or the prospect for change E(e α)
determines the actual threshold for eﬀective leadership. However, once this threshold is crossed,
then the leader’s actual ability helps determine the overall probability of change.
4.2 Leadership and Change: Institutional Constraints
Does the exercise of leadership diﬀer across the nature of political regimes? There are at least
two important aspects along which autocracies diﬀer from democracies and which may have an
impact on this question. First, the type of leader who gets selected/elected in the two regimes and
second, the degree of checks and balances on the leader. In the context of our model, we analyze
t h ei m p a c to fs u c hd i ﬀerences on the type of changes that are attempted and the probability of
success at their implementation.
On the one hand, an autocratic leader is much less institutionally constrained and can bring
about certain kinds of changes through the issue of an edict or decree. However, even for an
autocrat, achieving the voluntary and enthusiastic participation of the populace, to invest in
reform and change is diﬃcult. In part, this is because in an autocracy (or imperfect democracy) a
leader is more likely to be perceived as having preferences congruent with that of the elite or the
selectorate (in the terminology of Besley and Kudamatsu(2007)) rather than with the majority of
the populace. In terms of the model, leaders in autocracies are more likely to be elite-biased and
accordingly have reputation λ closer to 0 while leaders in democratic societies are more likely to
have preferences aligned with the majority, i.e. λ closer to 1. Now from Proposition 4, in the case
where expected gains pG are relatively high as compared with the costs, the ability threshold for
eﬀective leadership depends on the degree of congruence, a, between the majority and the elite. In
28the case of a high degree of congruence (i.e. a>a ∗), the ability threshold for eﬀective leadership is
higher for a self-interested (i.e. λ =0 )leader. In other words, taking the same ability distribution
of leaders across diﬀerent political regimes, we are more likely to see changes with all-round gains
being attempted in democracies. The reverse holds for the case of a low degree of congruence (i.e.
for a<a ∗). This implies that changes with a mismatch of interests between the majority and the
elite have a greater likelihood of being attempted in autocracies. Indeed this accords well with the
contrasting experiences of the type (and frequency) of economic reforms attempted in autocracies
such as China and Singapore versus those attempted (or not) in India.
In terms of outcomes, majority aligned (λ =1 ) leaders only attempt changes in state G1 where
it is in the majority’s (and elite’s) interest . On the other hand, elite-biased (λ =0 ) leaders attempt
changes in both states G1 and G0. Note that in the latter state, even if the change is successful,
only the elite gain from it. Thus, given that autocracies are more likely to have leaders with λ
close to 0, this implies that there is likely to be greater variance in the outcomes in autocracies as
against democracies. These accord well with the ﬁndings of Jones and Olken (2006) and Besley
and Kudamatsu (2007) that the variance in economic outcomes and institutional change is much
higher in autocracies than in well functioning democracies.
As e c o n dd i ﬀerentiating element of democracies is the checks and balances that it imposes on
its leaders. Such checks occur either through the democratic electoral process in which leaders
with dissonant objectives are punished by being voted out of power or through the independent
functioning of such extra-governmental institutions such as the media which can also serve to
constrain the leader. Presumably, the nature of these checks are weaker in autocracies as compared
to democracies. Indeed our discussion above captured part of this in that we assumed that leaders
with preferences that are not aligned with the majority are likely to (over time) get weeded out,
resulting in higher λ in democratic regimes. However, there is another dimension to the diﬀerence
between democracies and autocracies. In particular, civil liberties (and an independent media)
ﬂourish in democracies, while they are severely constrained in autocracies. A relatively simple way
to introduce such elements of checks into the model is by assuming that there exists a separate
agent, whom we call the ‘media’, who can independently verify the leader’s call for action. In
particular we assume that if the lead e rc a l l sf o ra c t i o ni nt h es t a t eG1, then with probability n
the media learns of the true underlying state and accordingly reveals it to the public. In all other
cases (i.e. in states B or G0 or in case it does not uncover the state), it says nothing. To capture
the increased degree of checks and balances in a democracy, we assume n>0 in a democracy,
while an autocracy is represented by n =0 .
Consider a leader with reputation λ. If this leader issues a call for action and the media does
not contradict it, then people’s updated probability about the state being G1 is given by:
Prob(G1|msg., silent media)=b b a =
b a
b a +( 1− n)(1 − b a)
29Note that this is increasing in n. In other words, the credibility of a leader’s call for action is greater
in a democracy as people have greater faith in the institutional checks and balances weeding out
attempts at misleading. The cutoﬀ participation cost c∗ for non-followers is now given by:




As n increases, b b a increases, and thus results in greater participation by the populace.
From a self-interested leader’s perspective, although he issues a call for action both in states
G0 and G1, he is more likely to be checked in state G0 when there is an independent and actively
functioning media as a watchdog i.e. when n is higher. Taking the expected mass of participants
me as given, the ﬁrst-order condition for his optimization problem is given by:
α[a +( 1− a)(1 − n)]pmeL = lis
Thus a higher n serves to lower his eﬀort at gathering information. This sets up the basic trade-
oﬀ here: while a freer media makes the leader more credible (similar to the ‘credibility eﬀect’
before) and elicits more response to his message, it lowers eﬀort put in by a self-interested leader
(the ‘motivation eﬀect’) and thus makes it less likely for suitable conditions to be uncovered. A
benevolent leader issues a call for action only in state G1 and thus for a given me, his decisions
are unaﬀected by n. In fact, setting up a similar optimization problem for the benevolent leader
yields his eﬀort ib = a
a+(1−a)(1−n)is. Thus as n approaches 1, both types of leaders become similar
in their actions. This is indeed the checking eﬀect of a democracy with a strong and independent
media.
Now if we look at the probability of change in state G1 for a given mass of followers, it is given
by:
P1 =[ λib +( 1− λ)is]pme = α
L
G2l





This expression captures the two eﬀects at work due to increased media vigilance n : one, the
term in curly brackets captures the eﬀect on lowering the leader’s eﬀort, while the increase in





, w h i c hg o e su pa sn rises. This is very
similar to (11) analyzing the eﬀect of reputation λ on the probability of change. Again a similar
analysis shows that the eﬀect of an increase in n on this probability is non-monotonic, as in ﬁgure
4. At the lower end i.e. close to n =0 , a slight increase in media independence serves to lower
the probability due to dominance of the motivation eﬀect. On the other hand, for larger values
of n, the eﬀect is the opposite due to the prevalence of the credibility eﬀect. In other words, for
regimes with an already reasonably independent media, a further increase in independence can
only improve matters. In contrast, in a regime with poorly functioning media, it can have the
opposite eﬀect. In terms of the probability of (harmful) change in the state G0, in addition to
30the above two eﬀects, there is the direct vigilance eﬀect of a more active media. This probability
is given by P0 =( 1− n)(1 − λ)ispme. An increase in n now has the additional direct eﬀect of
lowering P0 through the term (1 − n). Thus even at the higher end i.e. for n near 1, the positive
participation eﬀect of an increased n c a nb em u c hd a m p e n e db yt h i sd i r e c tv i g i l a n c ee ﬀect and
may serve to overall lower the probability of such harmful change occurring.
In summary, leaders in democracies (autocracies) are more eﬀective when dealing with change
that has relatively small distributional eﬀects. Increased checks and balances in the form of a
more independent media can improve the possibility of change when it is moderately independent
to begin with. This suggests that the relationship between political regime and leadership is not
straightforward. Rather it depends very much on both the initial conditions (about accountability
due to the media) as well as the nature of the change being contemplated.
5 Leadership and Change: Examples in Three Contexts
The framework described above applies to a variety of scenarios. In this section we describe
examples which illustrate the following key elements of our framework:
— the leader’s ability to rally and coordinate individual investment decisions, through both
‘discovering’ a window of opportunity for change as well as eﬀective communication;
— the feedback relationship between leadership and followership; a leader with a high reputation
attracts followers, who in turn make the leader more eﬀective.
5.1 Social and Environmental Reform Movements
Our framework can throw light on the role of leaders in bringing about social change of various
kinds, from the elimination of racial, gender and caste discrimination, the temperance movement to
even the campaign to ban child labor. Similarly, the framework is also applicable to environmental
movements. For instance the success of the Chipko Andolan (Hug the Trees) movement to prevent
deforestation of the Indian Himalayas was attributable to the organizational and communication
ability of the two leaders, Sunderlal Bahuguna and C.P. Bhatt. Similarly, the success of the ‘tree
woman’ Wangari Maathai and her Green Belt movement in Kenya owed much to her ability to
mobilize thousands of women followers. In contrast, the lack of success of environmental activist
Medha Patkar’s leadership of the Narmada Bachao Andolan to prevent the building of a large
scale dam on the Narmada River in India was arguably, in part due to a failure to mobilize a
suﬃciently large and diverse community of followers. We now describe in some detail one instance
of a leader’s role at such social change, namely that of Mahatma Gandhi’s attempt at eradicating
the practice of untouchability.
Gandhi and Untouchability in the Indian Caste System. One of the longest surviving social insti-
31tutions found anywhere is that of the caste system in India. A particularly pernicious aspect of
the caste system is the practice of ‘untouchability’. Some individuals, typically belonging to the
lowest caste, are designated as ‘untouchables’ and all other individuals in society are prohibited
from social interaction with these ‘untouchables’ who are only allowed to hold scavenging jobs. So-
cial interaction in such a society is governed by the caste code, where any individual who interacts
with an ‘untouchable’ becomes a social outcaste and untouchable himself.13
Gandhi had strong convictions and viewed elimination of untouchability as a moral and reli-
gious issue as early as 1915. In his personal life he embraced untouchables, welcomed them into his
Ashram and relabeled them ‘Harijans’ (children of God). However, Gandhi realized that educa-
tion and his personal example alone was not going to be suﬃcient to transform the age-old social
institution. This realization was not an accident, but due to Gandhi’s (costly) decision to spend
most of his time living in and interacting with village India - where he deliberately set up his
Ashram. This prolonged exposure to the impoverished and illiterate in village India gave Gandhi
a much better understanding of the pulse of the country, local traditions, the issues they felt
strongly about. Gandhi’s decades in village India correspond to a high i investment in our model.
Accordingly, Gandhi was patient and waited for the apposite window of opportunity to appear.
During this time, through his struggle against the British and his ﬁght against landlords and other
social evils, Gandhi’s reputation increased as did the number of his committed followers in and
outside the Congress Party (higher y). When the British proposed to have separate electorates for
the untouchables, Gandhi immediately perceived that this was the right moment to strike (i.e. a
state corresponding to G1)— since not only did he now have a large number of committed followers,
but also because he could obtain broad support by fusing a ﬁght against untouchability with a
ﬁght against British rule. Gandhi also showed his communication ability τ, since he was aware
that the best way for him to communicate the intensity of his feelings was through going on a fast
unto death in protest against both British rule and untouchability. According to Willmer (1984)
this resulted in
“......events that astounded all who knew of the almost automatic loathing and fear
felt by caste Hindus at the very thought of being touched by or in close proximity to
an Untouchable. Twelve Hindu temples were opened to Untouchables in Allahabad.
The members of the seven largest temples in Bombay voted 25000 to 445 in favor of
admitting Untouchable members..... Even more astonishing was the public fraterniza-
tion of Hindus with Untouchables. In the streets of the cities, high caste Hindus, were
seen eating together with the cobblers, street cleaners, sweepers and scavengers. In
Yervada prison, where Gandhi lay, copies of resolutions and statements against dis-
13Accordingly, a caste code can emerge as an equilibrium, with no individual having an incentive to unilaterally
violate its precepts (Akerlof, 1976).
32crimination from individuals, groups and whole communities across the country, rose
to a pile over ﬁve feet high...Gandhi had produced a miracle. The long tradition of
acceptance and approval of untouchability was shattered and the basis was laid for its
ultimate disappearance.”
In an era where there was almost no mass media such as radio and television and most of the
population was illiterate, this quick mobilization of support for eliminating untouchability was
partly possible due to the legion of committed followers that Gandhi had (Amin, 1979). The above
episode dramatically illustrates the symbiotic relationship between Gandhi and his followers that
made him so eﬀective.
5.2 Political Transitions
Leaders have been crucial in catalyzing changes in political institutions. Examples range from
Lenin’s role in leading the October revolution, to Lech Walensa in leading the Solidarity movement
to overthrow the status-quo in Poland or legislative and constitutional changes that expanded
the scope of voting rights (as in South Africa and the United States). Here we illustrate the
applicability of our framework using one of the best documented cases of institutional change
within a well-functioning democracy.
Change within a Democracy: Lyndon Johnson and the Voting Rights Act.14 For eighty two years
prior to 1957 there had been no civil rights bill for blacks that had successfully managed to pass
through the United States Senate due to opposition by a bloc of Southern senators. Despite many
attempts, there seemed to be no common ground between the pro and anti civil rights forces and
“the chasm between the two sides was unbridgeable” (Caro, page 948).
To begin with, Lyndon Johnson had already built up reputation as a powerful Majority leader
of the Senate. As Caro documents (pp. 562-65), Johnson was particularly eﬀective because he had
the committed support of the “Big Bulls” of the Democratic Party in addition to his sizable ‘ﬁrst
team’ of followers in the Senate.15 The loyalty that he commanded made Johnson a formidable
force in the Senate. However, having a large base of followers y was not enough — he needed
to ‘discover’ a window of opportunity. Motivated doubtless by his presidential ambitions, LBJ
s p e n ta ne n o r m o u sa m o u n to ft i m e( h i g hi) and resources trying to ﬁgure out the requirements,
weaknesses and strengths of all parties necessary to the striking of a deal. Lyndon Johnson’s
leadership skill lay in being the ﬁrst to ‘discover’ a window of opportunity for a deal in the form
14For most of what follows we extensively draw on Robert Caro’s (2002) masterly biography of Lyndon Johnson;
all page citations refer to that book.
15Individuals who were not on LBJ’s ‘ﬁrst team’ of committed supporters, found that the price of getting in his
good books was an explicit price in the form of favors to be done, before they could expect any beneﬁts. (see Caro’s
discussion on ‘The Johnson Rule’). This corresponds directly with the up-front cost y that an individual invests in
in order to become a follower in our model.
33of a mutually advantageous deal between two key factions in the Senate: the Southern Senators
who cared about civil rights legislation and the senators from the mountain states who wanted a
hydro-electric project at Hells Canyon. According to Caro, Johnson was skilled enough to see “a
potential connection between the two realities. No one else had seen it. During the ten years that
Hells Canyon had been before Congress, there had not been the slightest link between the dam
and civil rights”.16 Therefore, as a result of his skill (small l), and high investment i in identifying
a ‘window of opportunity’ and aided by his sizable ‘ﬁrst team’ of followers (high y), Johnson made
history. He managed to persuade enough senators on both sides to compromise, such that on
August 7, 1957 the path-breaking Voting Rights bill was ﬁnally approved - the ﬁrst civil rights
bill in eighty seven years. Goodwin (1976) reports that the bill “was not Eisenhower’s bill or the
Democrats or the liberals’; it was Lyndon Johnson’s” and was hailed by the New York Times as
“incomparably the most signiﬁcant domestic action of any Congress” in the twentieth century.
5.3 Organizational Transformation and Economic Reform
O u rf r a m e w o r ka l s oc a s t sl i g h to nt h er o l et h a ti ndividual leaders have had in formulating and
implementing policies in the economic sphere — be it at the level of the ﬁrm or economy-wide.
At the economy-wide level, leadership requires that the leader seize an appropriate ‘window of
opportunity’ to persuade ﬁrms, unions, workers and other groups to invest in the reform. Examples
range from the initiation of reform by Carlos Lleras Restrepo in Colombia, Narsimha Rao in
India to Bill Clinton persuading various interest groups to sign onto NAFTA. In each of these
instances, the set of technologically productive ﬁrms, trained workers and other groups who are
well prepared for economic reform and global integration may constitute the set of committed
followers. If circumstances look propitious and support for reform is large enough then enough
fence-sitters (the ‘non-follower’ participants in our model) may also join the process of reform.
Resuscitating Economic Reform: Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour. The future of economic reform
in post-Tiananmen China was seriously in doubt. The abortive Soviet coup of 1991 and the
collapse of the Soviet Union had strengthened the hands of Chen Yun and the leftist ideologues
at the expense of Deng and the reformers. Both in the media as well as within the party there
was a concerted attempt to discredit Deng’s policies of reform. Deng realized that winning the
political (and ideological) debate within the higher echelons of the party was diﬃcult. He further
recognized that communicating with the people directly was particularly diﬃcult in Beijing due to
the tight party control over the media. Deng’s leadership ability showed in his quick identiﬁcation
of the diﬃculties of trying to garner support in Beijing. More importantly, Deng had the ability
16According to Caro (pp. 892), Johnson “had the great lawmaker’s gift of identifying amid the many proposed
laws, the one that would best accomplish a larger purpose...give Negroes the vote — give them power and they could
start doing the rest themselves”.
34to recognize that he would need to mobilize support for his reforms by traveling to and directly
addressing his followers. Accordingly, he undertook the unprecedented ‘Southern Tour’ when he
travelled to the Southern provinces in general and Guangdong and Shanghai in particular (Ash
and Kueh, 1996). As pointed out by Zhao (1993), while Deng’s skill in choosing both the right
time and place to take on the central party hierarchy was important, success would not have
been possible were it not for his conﬁdence in the support of his followers in these regions -
the direct beneﬁciaries of reform in the bureaucracy and the population. Deng emphasized the
importance of broad based economic development and reform to communicate with his followers
and the lower level hierarchy in the party, using it as a way to criticize (and isolate) the ideological
hardliners (Naughton, 1993). The response to Deng Xiaoping’s appeal by both his followers and
non-followers was immediate. Deng’s supporters used his Southern tour to mobilize opinion, lobby
and put pressure on the party hierarchy; thousands of cables and letters poured into Beijing party
headquarters expressing support for Deng’s policies. Not surprisingly, Deng’s Southern Tour is
widely regarded as single-handedly shifting the political momentum decisively and irreversibly in
favor of the continuation of economic reform in China.
Jack Welch and Organizational Transformation at GE: Even in the case of ﬁrms, where contracts
and incentives are available, there is often a voluntary component to the relationship between the
CEO and his employees. As Kotter (2002) emphasizes, much of what separates successful ﬁrms
from the rest arises from the non-contractible aspects of employee decision making. A classic
example is Jack Welch’s role at General Electric. He took a key role in catalyzing organizational
transformation by facilitating coordinated (costly) investment by the ﬁrm’s employees - from
retraining, acceptance of new management practices, buying into the organizational philosophy
and so on. When he took over as CEO of GE, Jack Welch was quick to recognize that in the absence
of continual changes in management practice, organizational philosophy and restructuring, even
highly proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to suﬀer from managerial sclerosis and declining proﬁtability (Kotter,
2002). He did this by putting his followers (called his “varsity team”) into 12 of the 14 key
managerial positions. According to Barlett and Wozny (2005), all of these managers had invested
in and agreed with Welch’s “strong commitment to the new management values, a willingness to
break with the old GE culture and most of all, an ability to take charge and bring about change”.
With his followers in position, Welch further showed his ability to identify shifts and emerging
opportunities from anticipating globalization of business in the eighties to adopting e-business
before others did. These included his introduction of several organizational transformations and
new management practices such as ‘Work-out’, ‘Best Practice’ and ‘Six Sigma’. Together, these
played a signiﬁcant part in revitalizing GE.
356C o n c l u s i o n
Leaders are ubiquitous across societies and organizations and have often been central to the trans-
formation of organizations, political institutions and in many instances of social and economic
reform. In this paper we took a ﬁrst step towards analyzing the role of leadership in catalyzing
change. Our analysis emphasizes that in order to understand eﬀective leadership, it is necessary
to focus on the nature of the relationship between a leader and his followers in transforming the
prospects for change. The two-way interaction between followership and the supply of leadership
initiative can endogenously give rise to threshold eﬀects, with slight diﬀerences in the underlying
structural conditions or in the leaders’s ability resulting in dramatic diﬀerences in the prospects
for change. In terms of the leader’s interests, the model shows that under a broad set of conditions,
the populace may deliberately prefer to follow an ambitious leader whose interests may not always
be congruent with theirs over a benevolent one with congruent preferences. As a result, while such
leaders are more likely to bring about change, this change may often not be in the best interests
of the majority. Thus our analysis also throws light on why ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ leaders may
both have their followers.
However our analysis is but a ﬁrst step. Our framework explored only the broad contours
of the impact of leadership in encouraging participation to bring about change. Several other
important elements of leadership are obvious directions for future study. For instance, while the
mode of change (captured by parameters such as the uncertainty of the process p, the gains G
and the costs to change c) is taken as given in our model, an important aspect of leadership is
perhaps choosing the right instrument for change. For example, in the context of political change,
violent insurgency, peaceful demonstrations or propaganda (see Glaeser, 2005) could be several
possible means to achieve the same end. The leader’s role would then be to determine which
of these instruments would be the most appropriate under the given circumstances. A second
aspect of leadership which has not been studied in our model (except in the welfare comparisons
for diﬀerent types of leaders) is leader selection. For example, if there were diﬀerent individuals
espousing diﬀerent instruments for change, who gets selected as the leader and how does this
depend on the underlying environment? Or if there are multiple leaders, what is the dynamics of
followership across the leaders and what is the impact on the overall chances for change? Aspects
of the leader-follower relationship also deserve to be explored further. As pointed out by Levi
(2006), ‘leaders have the power to misinform and to manipulate, but they also have the power to
inspire change’. In this context it would be useful to analyze in more detail the psychological and
emotional underpinnings of the leader-follower relationship.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium level of participation, c∗
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s t i o n1 :Consider equation (1) for a given level of y>0.A tc∗ =0 , the LHS
is less than the RHS as y>0. At c∗ = cH, by assumption 1, the RHS = pτG < cH = LHS.
Both sides of the equation are linear in c∗ (and are as depicted in ﬁgure 2); thus there is a unique
solution to the equation in the range c∗ ∈ [0,c H].
The probability of successful change in state G1 is given by:






Increases in y, p, G or τ or a decrease in cH raise the RHS of (1) but have no eﬀect on the
LHS, and thus (from ﬁgure 2) result in an increase in c∗. Hence, these changes in the underlying
parameters raise the probability of successful change in state G1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Consider equation (7). Clearly c∗ =0is a solution. Eliminating a
c∗ from both sides, we see that while the RHS is independent of c∗, the LHS has three roots, at
c∗ =0 ,c H and 2cH. In the relevant range i.e. between c∗ =0and c∗ = cH, it is inverse U-shaped.
Thus, as depicted in ﬁgure 2(b), there will be either two solutions to equation (7) (case 1 in the
ﬁgure) or none (case 2 in the ﬁgure, in which case there is no interior equilibrium, and the only
equilibrium involves c∗ =0 ,y=0and i =0 ) .
Which case occurs thus depends on whether or not the RHS is greater or less than the highest
point of the LHS. In the range c∗ ∈ [0,c H], the maximum of the LHS occurs at c∗ = cH(1− 1 √
3),




3lGk . Whether or not this exceeds the RHS i sg i v e nb y( 8 )
above.17
17Equation (7) characterizes the overall equilibrium in the case where the elite group is of zero mass. Suppose
39Proof of Corollary 1:
Derivation of Equilibrium under complementarity:
Again starting from period 2, the cutoﬀ cost for the marginal non-follower is given by equating








Under assumption 20, (15) always has a unique interior solution for any y>0.
In period 1, the leader’s problem of how much to invest in acquiring information about the




[y +( 1− y)
c∗
cH
]θL1 = li (16)
or using (15), i = αaL1c∗/(Gl).
Finally, the period 0 problem of deciding on followership is identical to the previous analysis,





As before, using y from (15) and i = αaL1c∗/(Gl), we can rearrange the above ﬁrst-order






















Solutions to this equation (if any) characterize equilibria for the overall game here.
Clearly c∗ =0(i.e. one where no one becomes a follower, the leader expends no eﬀort and
overall there is zero probability of change), is an equilibrium. To look for interior equilibria, we
eliminate a c∗ from both sides of (9). The LHS now is the same as that of (7) and thus between
c∗ =0and c∗ = cH, it is inverse U-shaped (as in ﬁgure 2(b)). The RHS however is diﬀerent and
depends on θ.
For θ<1, 1






cH is increasing in c∗.
At c∗ =0 ,L H S=0> − 1




θ −1) > 0
by assumption 20. Thus there is always at least one interior solution to (9). In other words, for
instead the elite had a small but positive mass given by ne, while that for the majority is nm =1− ne. It can be






























which is very similar in its properties as equation (7). Thus, the threshold eﬀect holds here too.
400 <θ<1, in addition to the no-action equilibrium, there always exists an interior equilibrium
with a positive probability of change.
For θ>1, 1
θ − 1 < 0 and hence the RHS is decreasing in c∗.
Note that the LHS is inverse U-shaped and attains its maximum value at c∗ = cH(1 − 1 √
3),


















θ − 1), there will be no interior solution for the equilibrium
condition (9) which implies that in this case the only equilibrium is the no-action one.









Taking the derivative of f(b a)=b a[ 1
pτG −
(1−y)e a
cH ]2 with respect to b a, we ﬁnd that f0(b a) ≷ 0 according
as cH
3(1−y)pτG ≷ b a. Since P1 is inversely related to f(b a), and b a is increasing in λ, this establishes the
result.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :Eliminating a c∗, the LHS of both (7) and (14) can be written as
α2Lτ
lGk c∗(1 − c∗
cH)(1 − c∗
2cH), implying that it is inverse U-shaped, as in Figure 2(b).
The RHS of (7) is then ( 1
pGτ − 1
cH)/a2, while that for (14) is 1
pGτ − a
cH. Comparing the two,
the RHS of (7) is bigger or less than the RHS of (14) according as cH ≷ pGτ(1 + a2
1+a).
Now a2
1+a is increasing in a, and has a maximum value of 1/2. Thus, if cH > 3
2pGτ, then the
RHS of (7) is always bigger than the RHS of (14) and therefore the threshold for a benevolent
leader is more stringent.
On the other hand, if cH < 3
2pGτ, there exists an a∗ ∈ (0,1) at which cH = pGτ(1 +
(a∗)2
1+a∗).
Below a∗,c H >p G τ(1 + a2
1+a) i.e. the RHS of (7) is bigger than the RHS of (14), meaning that
the threshold for a benevolent leader is more stringent. For a>a ∗, the reverse holds and the
threshold is more stringent for a self-interested leader.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :To derive the ex-ante welfare WB under a benevolent leader, we
take the period 0 payoﬀ from (3) and plug back the optimal y from (4) together with the leader’s
equilibrium choice iB = αaL1

















Similarly the ex-ante welfare WS under a self-interested leader is derived by plugging in the

















41Note that for a given c∗,W B <W S for all a<1 and as expected are equal for a =1 . Also
note that WB and WS are both increasing in c∗; thus, if c∗ under a self-interested leader is bigger
than that under a benevolent leader, WS will exceed WB.


































the former being that under a benevolent leader and the latter for a self-interested leader. The
left-hand side of both are identical and represent an inverse U-shaped function of c∗ as depicted in
ﬁgure 2. The right hand side of both are constant and whether the Pareto-dominant equilibrium c∗






cH i.e. if cH >p G τ(1 + a2
1+a).
If cH > 3
2pGτ, then this holds for all a ∈ [0,1], while if cH < 3
2pGτ, it holds for a small enough.
Thus in either of these two cases, the (Pareto-dominant) equilibrium c∗ under a self-interested
leader is higher than that under a benevolent leader, and consequently the ex-ante welfare under
a self-interested leader WS is greater than that under a benevolent leader WB.
42